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In the long run, sound, efficient securities  Pardy discusses the second of these in detail,
markets can contribute to economic growth; in  providing guidelines for basic infrastructural
the short run, they play an important rolc ip  requirements. Essentially such an infrastructure
financial liberalization and deepening. They do  must provide four things:
so principally by providing a means for both
capital raisers and investors to diversify risk.  *  Certainly about property rights and con-
tracts.
Pardy provides a guide to issues involved in
institutional and regulatory reform of securities  * Transparent trading and other procedures
markets - and a discussion of the practical  and public disclosure by companies of all
implications of different policy options and  information relevant to the value of their securi-
sequencing decisions.  ties.
Pardy argues that establishing souiid  securi-  *  Protection against unfair practices by
ties markets requires institutional development  insiders and intermediaries.
that is a substantial task for many developing
countries. Prerequisites for the development of  *  Protection against the financial failure of
securities markets include:  intermediaries and market institutions such as
clearinghouses.
* A macroeconomic and fiscal environment
conducive ts the supply of quality securities-  Pardy also provides examples of the policy
as well as sufficient demand for them.  conflicts and uncertainties that are routine in
securities market reform and development, and
A legal, regulatory, and institutional infra-  suggests approaches to managing them.
structure that can support efficient operation of
the securities market.
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BibliographyI  INTRODUCrION
Sound and efficient securities markets allow capital raisers and investors to diversify
sources of investment capital and spread investment risk. They thus facilitate  financial deepening and
liberalization, and,  in the  long term, lower the cost  of capital to  enterprises and  contribute to
economic growth.
But the path to these positive outcomes is by no means clearly mapped nor easily
traversed. l nis paper identifies the basic institutional building blocks for developing sound securities
markets.  On the  other  hand,  it provides no simple prescription for optimal securities market
development, nor an assurance that such development will  be anything but a long-term, faltering and
costly process.
Section II locates the recent growth in interest in securities markets in LDCs in the
context of the general move to financial  liberalization and indicates  some practical implications  of that
linkage.  It also provides a guide to the minimum institutional *nfrastructure required to support
efficient operation of a securities market.
Three subsequent sections address securities market institutional issues which are of
particular concern to policy makers at present, but about which there is less unanimity. Section IH
deals with the securities market's role in the efficient allocation of investment funds, and with the
related problems of informational asymmetries and agency relationships.  It  posits that in many
developing countries securities markets are as yet not well placed to play an efficient allocative and
monitoring role and that extensive institutional development is required in order for them to do so.
Section IV describes changes occurring in the way securities markets are structured and operated
which have implications for the efficiency and stability of the markets, and for the way they are
regulated.  It emphasizes the need for co-ordination and cooperation between supervisory agencies
within and between countries.  And Section V addresses the role government plays in forming and
influencing securities markets and the policy making and administrative  capacity it requires to play
that role effectively. It highlights  the uncertainties and conflicts inherent in government policy in this
area and suggests that extensive investment in human resource development and institution building
is essential for success.2
II  RATIONALE, CONTEXT AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Securities markets are receiving more attention from LDC policy makers as part of
financial liberalization programs to facilitate market-based economic development.  On the other
hand, the role of securities markets in the liberalization process has varied from place to place and
the course of financial liberalization has been halting and partial in many LDCs. Recent experience
includes examples of successes and failures, booms and busts, policy advances and retreats.'  As a
result, we are further advanced in our knowledge of securities markets in LDCs than we were twenty
years ago but important lessons are still being learned.
Basic Enabling Environment
The basic building blocks of a sound securities market can be described in two sets
of pre-conditions:
(i)  a macro-economic and fiscal environment conducive to the supply of good
quality securities and sufficient demand for them; and
(ii)  a  legal,  regulatory and  institutional infrastructure  capable of  supporting
efficient operation of the securities mArket.
Macro-economy.  The demand for and supply of securities is crucially linked to the
state  of  the  macro-economy.  Where  the  macro-economy is conducive to  profitable  business
operation, a sufficient number of sound businesses can develop to a stage where access to securities
markets is useful for their continued growth.  They can then offer their securities to the public for
investors to hold or trade, thus creating the securities market.
Several  studies of the history  of financial  liberalization in  southern cone countries have  been published. In relation to Asia there
is relatively  fewer but two interesting new  cross-country  studies are: Wanda Tseng  and Robert Corker, "Ftnancial  Liberalization,
Monetazy  Demanid  and Monetary Policy In Asian Countriesw,  Occasional Paper, IMF, July 1991; and Cho, Y J  and D R
Khatkate,  'Lessons of Financial Uberalization in Asia: A Comparative  Study, Discussion Paper No.50, World Bank, 1989.
The Korean experience  is the subject of considerable interest and a useful recent study is Alice Amsden and Yoon-Dae Euh,
"Republic Of Korea's Financial Reforms:  What Are The Lessons?",  Discussion  Paper No.30, UNCTAD, April 1990.3
Without sufficient such profitable businesses  with good prospects for the future, there
is little reason to have a  securities market.  This is so for two reasons.  First, investors will be
disinclined  to invest in unprofitable ventures or where business uncertainty is high.  And second, to
the degree that they do invest in such circumstances they will require higher returns and stand a
greater chance on aggregate to make economically  sub-optimal allocation decisions. 2 The second of
these points is sometimes forgotten, especially  where there is a desire on the part of government to
stimulate securities market growth through fiscal and other incentives, perhaps allied to plans for
privatization of state enterprises.  But it is inevitable that if such stimulation creates  an active
securities market made up largely of speculative investment in unproductive enterprises it contributes
little to economic welfare. 3
In contrast, the basLe  of an economically  beneficial securities market is a supply of
good quality securities from profitable enterprises meeting strong demand from investors.  And it
follows from this that the starting point for securities market development policies on the part of
government is to tend to macroeconomic  fundamentals  which will foster business profitability,  savings
growth, and investment confidence.
Taxation.  Even with this pre-condition met, differential effective tax rates on either
income or capital gains from different financial instruments will  distort capital raising and investment
decisions.  It  is common in LDCs which have favored directed credit  and  state  ownership of
commercial banks to  find that  tax rates discriminate in favor of savings and demand deposits as
opposed to securities investment, and in favor of borrowings  from banks as opposed to capital raisings
from the public.  These policies were used extensively to  concentrate  capital accumulation and
allocation decisions into the sphere over which government could exercise the most direct policy
control.
In moving  to more market-oriented capital accumulation and allocation mechanisms,
it is essential that these taxation differentials be removed. Otherwise, the withdrawal  of government
from credit decisions will change the nature  of market distortions but not remove them. This is
because enterprises and investors will have an incentive to structure capital raising and investment
2  Trading profits to individual investors notwithstanding,  economic  welfare is not served if in aggregate capital is supplied to
unprofitable  enterprises at the expense  of profitable ones.
3  Two examples  illustrate the point: about half the total turnover on the Bangkok  Stock Exchange  in 1991  was made up of trade
in the shares of stockbroking  firms  who in turn make their profit from trading shares; and on the Jakarta Stock Exchange  ther
are twioce  as many stock brokers as listed companies  and a high  turnover ratio which  bas led observers to suggest  that there may
be  "churninge - excessive  trading turnover for speculative  gain and increased commission  income for the stock brokes4
on the basis of tax considerations rather than on the fundamentals of value and risk. To the extent
that their decisions are so distorted, they risk delivering sub-optimal economic welfare outcomes by
diverting capital from enterprises with the ability +o make best use of the funds.
Some would argue that mere removal of the old pattern of incentives is not suffic:ent
and that a (temporary) scheme of incentives which actually favors the securities market should be
implemented  to "kick-start' the market after its previous suppression. As is discussed  in a subsequent
section of this paper, the desirability  of such schemes is doubtful.  Instead, the starting point should
be a taxation regime which is neutral in its impact on choices between different financial instruments,
whether from the point of view of capital raiser or investor.
This neutraity should also include taxes which add to transaction costs. For example
stamp duties and turnover taxes can be a disincentive to  investment and should not be imposed
without careful consideration of their impact
Market Infrastructure.  The second of our two sets of preconditions are those which
attempt to directly enable the securities market to operate  in an efficient, fair and stable manner.
They are the legal, regulatory and institutional infrastructure upon  hich the market's operation is
based.  As mentioned briefly in the introduction, in essence this infrastructure provides four things:
certainty as to property rights and contract;
transparency of trading and other procedures, and public disclosure by companies of
all information relevant to the value of their securities;
protection against unfair practices by intermediaries and insiders; and
protection against the financial failure of intermediaries and market institutions such
as clearing houses.
These four are discussed in turn below.
Clear rights to property and enforceable rights and obligations under contracts are
crucial to  the  ability to  trade  and transfer  title to  securities, and  enter  into option  and  other
agreements concerning securities.  They are the obvious piDlars  upon which a securities market is5
built.  Government  action to reduce market externalities  in this arca will,  at a minimum,  reduce
information  and transaction  costs,  and at base,  provide  ihe very  possibility  of trading  in an organized
market.
Transparency  of trading  and other procedures  is necessary  for efficient  price setting,
and for confidence  in the fairness  of the market  In relation  to the first,  if trading  is fragmented  or
conducted  privately  with Umited  disclosure  of quantity  and price,  each new  transaction  in effect  must
be based  on relatively  expensive  search costs  and runs the risk of being transacted  markedly  out of
line with prevailing  prices. This not only raises risks  for investors,  it weakens  the price discovery
mechanism  of the market  which  is the basis  of its entetprise  valuation  and monitoring  function. In
relation  to the second,  opaque trading  procedures  engender  suspicion  of market manipulation  and
other malpractices  which  undermine  market confidence  and reduce  investment.
Public  disclosure  of relevant  information  about  securities  is important  both for pricing
efficiency  and market confidence. If investors  are to make sound  judgements  about the value of
securities  they must be fully  informed  of relevant  facts. Financial  statements  form the core of the
necessary  information  but the narrative  content of public  offer documents  which  describe  business
plans  and make  projections  of growth  and profit,  and also  timely  announcement  of events  which  are
likely  to affect  the price of securities,  are both important.  To the extent that such  information  is not
available  or is unreliable,  investors  face greater risks  and will require  a consequently  higher  retum,
thus raising  the cost of capital;  or they  will make uninformed  investment  decisions  with a reduced
likelihood  of directing  funds  to the enterprises  most likely  to make best use of them.
Investor  protection  against  unfair  practices  serves  a similar  purpose to transparency
of market  processes  but relies upon supervision  by a supervisory  authority,  and the imposition  by it
of penalties  for wrong-doing,  rather than on scrutiny  of transactions  by  investors  themselves  to protect
their own  interests.
And as a final  safety-net,  prudential  regulation  of intermediaries  and some form of
investor  protection  fund are required  to give  investors  confidence  that they  will  not suffer financial
loss from the failure  of an intermediary.  Prudential  regulation  also provides  a degree of financial
stability  to the market as a whole  by helping  to reduce  bankruptcies  or delays  in the performance  of
contracts  by  intermediaries,  both of which  have  detrimental  flow-on  effects  which  may  be system-wide.6
This complex of powers, obligations, rights and functions are provided for in the legal, regulatory and
institutional  infrastructure  which  supports  the  securities  market.  Each  component  of  the
infrastructure is described below.
nstiitutional infrastrnture  provides  the  operational  basis  for  the  market:
intermediaries to provide trading, investment management and iinancial advisory  services; market and
market-related service providers for stock exchanges,  over-the-counter markets, market information
services,  transaction clearance and settlement systems,  and securities transfer, registration  and custody;
and  providers of  aincillary  services such as accounting and  auditing, legal advice, and  financial
valuation and debt rating services.
Regulator  infrstrcture  centres on the government body which has the power and
responsibility to supervise the market but also includes self-regulatory organizations such as stock
exchanges, accounting standards boards and accounting and auditing professional associations and
similar organizations. It also includes their rules and regulatory procedures and facili,ies  such as stock
exchange listing and trading rules or accounting and auditing standards, plus the monitoring and
enforcement of these rules.
legal  infrastrucure  provides the  underpinning to  the operational  and regulatory
infrastructure.  It establishes the framework of property rights, contractual relationships, forms of
incorporation, and  rig,"ts and responsibilities of participants in the market.  It also specifies the
powers and responsibilities  of the government supervisory  authority and self-regulatory  organizations.
Included in the legal infrastructure are the means to protect the rights bestowed; for
example, to sue for recompense where harm is suffered, to  prosecute breaches of the law and
regulations, or to resolve disputes by conciliation or arbitration.  These avenues of action may be
through the general court system, a special division  of the court, or an extra-judicial  body such as a
conmuercial  dispute tribunal. However provided, they must be effective avenues of action, producing
reasonably speedy, consistent and transparent  decisions.  If they are only formal rights with no
realistic course of action to pursue, they will not  provide an effective base for securities market
activity.
This summary  of the building blocks of a securities market gives an indication of the
scope and scale of what is involved. It suggests that it is a long-term task with a heavy emphasis on
institutional and human resource development, whether in government supervisory authorities, the7
courts, or private sector institutionm  such as securities exchanges, accounting and legal professional
associations or  financial intermediaries.  It  involves coordinated action by government across a
number of policy areas and the development by government of new technica' and human resource
capacities.  And finally, the creation of the supporting infrastructure of laws, requires commitment
and understanding at the political level to enable their drafting and enactment.
Role in Financial Liberalization
Financial liberalization has been a notable feature of LDC economic ref.  im  since the
r4 iiddle 1980s. The desizability  of financial  deepening,  and liberalization had been identified more than
ten years before by McKinnon and Shaw 4 but it was the financial  distress of the 1980s,  combined with
political changes in many countries in the sarrm,  period, which brought the need for financial reform
to prominence. 5
In the short period in which financial  liberalization has been underway in LDCs (and
developed countries) much has been learned from both theory and practice.  The early work of
McKinnon and Shaw has been augmented by later studies detailing the imperfections of markets,
unexpected results of liberalization, and the partial and faltering way in which liberalization has
progressed as a result. 6
In this process, securities markets have sometimes been prominent, sometimes not.
For example, in Korea the securities markets, especially  the corporate equity market was promo.ed
by the government as an important element of financial liberalization. 7 And several countries in
Eastern Europe have quickly  established  quite sophisticated  stock market infrastructure and relatively
4  McKinnon,  R 1,  Money And Capital In Economic Development.  Brookings  Institution, Washington  DC, 1973. Shaw,  Edward
S, Financial Deepening in Economic Develooment. Oxford Univesity Pres, New York, 1973.
5  World Devzlopment Report 1989, page 70.
6  Among others, Joseph Stiglitz  has written extensively  on the topic; see for example "Information  and Capital Markets",  in W
F Sharpe and C Cootner, eds., Financial Economics. Essaw In Honor Of Paul Cootner. Prentice Hall, New  Jersey, 198Z2  and  r
"Fmnancial  Markets And Development",  in Paul Collier and Colin Mayer,  eds., Finance and Economic Development Oxford
Review Of Economi^ Policy, VolS, No.4, Winter 1989.  Of particular relevance to this paper are writings on institutional
economics, for example: Ronald H Coase, '"The New Institutional Economics",  ir Journal of Theoretical and Institutional
Economics, Vol.3 No.1, 1984;  Douglas North, "The New Institutional Econon ics", in The Journal  of Theoretical and
Institutional Economics, Vol.5, No.1, 1986; Douglas North, Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; and Oliver Wiliamson, The Economic Institutions Of Capitalism:  Firms.
Markets,  Relational Contracting.  The Free Press,  New York,  1985. Fry, Maxwell,  "Financial  Development Theories and Recent
Experience"  in Coller and Mayer,  eds., Finance and Development  op. cit. provides a useful empirical  survey.
7  See Alice Amsden  and Yoon-Dae Euh, "Republic  o. Korea's Financial Reforms: What are the Lessons?",  UNCTAD Discussion
Paper No. 30, April 1990,  pp. 49 to 53.8
liberal stock market policies  and laws,  partly in the expectation  that these wili provide  necessat
support  to general financial  liberalization.  In a recent assessment  of .he Eastem Euiopean situation
McKinnon  suggests  that securities  market development  should have priority  even oaer liberalized
bank lending  in the first  several  years  of transition  to a capitalist  financial  market  where  the preceding
order has created a large bad debt problem  for banks.'
On the other hand, Japan and Germany  provide counter-examples  of successful
economic  Prowth  without  significant  securities  market  liberalization.  Indeed,  in the case  of corporate
equities,  very  few  countries  in the developed  world  had placed  much  emphasis  on open and efficient
markets  until the last oine  or two years,  and the halting  steps towarda  liberalization  being taken at
present  by some Western Europe3n  countries  does not provide  an indication  of radical  changes  on
the horizon.
Costs  and BenetAts
It can be seen that much  is still  being  learned  about financial  liberalization  and many
questions remain about the optimal sequencing,  pace and scope of securities  development  as a
component  of general finar.cial  liberalization.  A useful  starting  point in exploring  these questions  is
to identify  the pros and cons of securities  markets  - why  they are important  in a well functioning
financial  system,  and what costs they  impose.
The primary  benefit of a securities  markr;t  is that it constitutes  a liquid  trading  and
price  determining  mechanism  for a diverse  range  of financial  instruments.  This allows  risk-spreading
by  capital  raisers  and investors  and matching  of the maturity  preferences  of capital  raisers  (generally
long-term)  and investors  (often short-terni). This in turn stimulates  investment  and lowers  the cost
of capital,  contributing  in the long-term  to economic  growth.'
There are other benefits  as well.  For example,  development  of other parts of the
financial  system  can benefit from the existence  of an active securities  market.  Development  of
contraLo.ual  savings  institutions  falls  into this  category: they gain  from being  able to maximize  their
8  Ronald  I McKinnon,  The  Order  Of Economic  Liberalization:  Finandal  Control  In  The  Transition  To A Market  Econoy Johns
Hopkins  University  Press,  Baltimore,  1991,  p. 139.
9  See  Jeffy  Jenkins,  'Capital  Markets  And  Development  Essential  And  hTelevani",  in  Steve  H4anke  and  Alan  Walters,  eds, CAmitRi
l.aarket  And Development, ICS Press, San Francisco, 1991, pp. 1-24 for an over view.  Also Ross Levine "Stock Marke,
Grawth  and Tax PolicY',  in  Journal of Fnance,  Vol.XLVI  NoA,  September 1991, pp.1445-1465;  and Levine  and Robert  King,
"Fimancial  Indicators and Growth in a Cross Secton of Countries", WPS 819, World Bank, January 1992, for empirical
questoning of thVe  It  between  securities markets and development.9
retu;n to investors and maintain an appropriate risk profile through trading liquid debt and equity
instruments. An active securities market also provides some competition to commercial  banks in the
provision of deot financing, thus spiurring  the banks to improve efficiency and service levels, as well
as providing the banks with a means to securitize their debt and better manage the maturity rwatch
and risk profile of their balance sheets.  And beyond the financial sector, the success of privatization
programs depends to a degree on the availability  of secondary markP  to allow investors to liquidate
their holdings at a time of their choosing, thus making their initial investment more attracive.
On the cost side are negative impacts on the stabilitv of the financial sector and an
associated reduction in government's ability to ameliorate those impacts. These arise from the very
nature of the market mechanism,  which emphasizes  voluntary and (relatively) unhindered actions by
participants in the pursuit of profit and the avoidance of risk  One example is the susceptibility  of
- urities markets to manipulation and other practices which distort pricing and allocation decisions,
and  have a  negative impact on investor confidence so that the supply of funds to  the market is
reduced.'°  Securities markets also rapidly transmit external shocks and which may have little or no
relation to the domestic economy but simply  reflect the mood of the intermational  securities market.
Another  is the impact on payment systems and bank capital ratios which can arise from price and
volume volatility in securities markets. In this case the impact 's felt in two ways: flow  effects arising
from meeting the payment obligations which follow securities  transactions; and stock effects arising
from decreases in the value of securities portfolios held by financial intermediaries  which put pressure
on them to raise other capital quickly to meet capital adequacy requirements."  And iinally there
is scope for securities markets to provide  a substantial wealth transfer mechanism  which may  not have
socially desirable outcomes.  This can happen in two ways. First, some investors - presumably the
least sophisticated ones -will tend to lose money to the advantage of more knowledgeable investors.
And second,  access to listing on the stock exchange could be restricted and the "gateway"  to listing
used much like directed credit to ensure that funds flow to favored firms.
10  IhU problem has been particularly evident in newly established  corporate equity markets in LDCs but events of the last two
years show that developed financial markets continue to grapple with it on a substantial scale; for example: insider trading in
equities (New York),  manipulation of low-yield  bond prices (New York), trading floor irrcgularities in futures and options
(Chicago), manipulation  of US government  bond market (New York),  fraudulent and manipulative  corporate takeover practices
(London), misuse of corporate assets to the detriment of shareholders (London).
For example,  in the USA, the October 1997  stock market crash placed straL-  on both the payment system  and the abiity of
l,anks to meet the demand for credit from securities  broker/dealers  drawing down  on existing  lines  of credit and seeking further
lines in order to meet their capital adequacy  obligations. No breakdown  occurred as the Federal Reserve  was  able to act quickly
to incrase  liquidity in the system  and closely  monitored banks'  capital positions.  Many  LDC central banks find it difficult  to
act as effectively  because their reserves are smaller and their market aeperience less.  In October 1987,  the result was closure
of many LDC markets for from seveal days to a week, and the failure of many brokers.10
Financial Sector Interrelations
There is also an interplay between securities market development and liberalization
in other financial areas.  This interplay brings both costs and benefits and overall requires a higher
level of coordination between policy areas and a build up of government's implementation capacity.
For example,  following  the sharply reduced inflow of foreign debt capital in the 1980s,
direct foreign exchange controls such as restrictions on inward and outward capital flows  have been
removed or reduced as part of liber,ization  prograkas  in many JLDCs  in order to encourage foreign
equity investment.  Where direct  foreign investment is involved, the inherent  illiquidity of the
investments swooths out peaks and troughs in the flow of capital and, as a result, has a less volatile
impact on foreign exchange reserves than does foreign portfolio investment. In the case of foreign
portfolio investment, the liquidity  provided by domestic secondary markets can put considerable  stress
on foreign exchange reserves because foreign investors are able to sell securities rapidly in l?rge
volumes and repatriate capital.  The rapid depletion of foreign exchange reserves which can result
is especially a problem in smaller open economies.
A floating exchange rate mitigates the effects of such outflows while a fixed rate
exacerbates them.  Also, reforms can be sequenced as in Korea for example, which eased controls
un  international capital flows only after  the domestic financial rnarkeL  had  been  reformed and
domestic interest rates deregulated within a well-functioning  government bond market and tightened
them when domestic conditions required  it." 2 The point to be  noted here is that  liquid capital
markets soon require and attract foreign portfolio investment  and will thus require skilled cross-policy
coordination and implementation by government.
Another example is the interplay between securities markets and government control
over money supply.  On the one hand, an active securities market provides a means for the exercise
of monetary policy through the issue and repurchase of government securities in a liquid market.
This is an important step in financial  liberalization. On the other hand, active securities markets alter
the pattern of demand for money, and booming stock markets create a liquidity  and weaith overhang
which  is  potentially  inflationary.  Money  management  is  therefore  more  complicated in  an
environment of an active stock market and an open capital account.
12  Sang-Woo  Nam, "Korea's Financial  Reform Since The Early 198W",  WPS fonhcoming, World Bank. 1992, pp.52-54;  and see
Amsden and Euh, "Republic  of Korea"s  Financial Reformse,  op ctL11
Because one factor in an inflationary cycle is the supply of money, tightening money
supply is an important tool of government in keeping control over inflation. But where there is an
active corporate bond market, the private sector is able to issue debt instruments which have many
of the characteristics of money. This lessens government's direct control over the quantity of (near)
money in circulation. It can respond with more stringent policies, especially raising interest rates in
an attempt to make corporate bonds less attractive as investments, thus reducing their supply. But
this  use of  interest rates  may have damaging ramifications if it diverts savings from productive
investment to passive interest earning, or of it fuels foreign interest in the local currency and creates
so called "hot money"  which destabilizes foreign exchange management.' 3
Sequencing
Considerations such as those described above are not intended as arguments against
development of securities markets, rather they point to the importance of the sequencing of securities
market development in coordination with other financial sector reforms, and the development by
government of adequate implementation capacity. A suggested order of economic liberalization is
along the following  lines.  First comes control over the central government's finances leading to a
balanced budge'  stringent anti-inflation measures, and overall macroeconomic stability. After this
comes a gradual opening of domestic capital markets with banks playing the central role but with the
legal and institutional basis for non-bank intermediation being established early to allow for the
growth of commercial credit  through  direct lending or  markets in short-term  commercial bills.
Ultimately, commercial bonds  and  equities  can  also evolve from  this  base  as macroeconomic
conditions make them viable. And finally  foreign exchange controls are eased - firstly  on the current
account and then the capital account - but this is a gradual easing of restrictions in line with the
growth in the robustness of the domestic macroeconomy and financial market.  In this schema the
legal and institutional basis for securities markets is laid down relatively early but that actual growth
of the market is dependent  on the government establishing the right macroeconomic conditions.
Also, the short-term end of the market is predicted to be of most immediate importance, with long
term bords and equities growing in importance somewhat later. 14
13  For an indication  of the severity of the effects this has and the way in which  government  can use the market to deal with them
see Un See Yan, 'Interaction of Exchange  Rate Policy  and Monetary Policy Te  Case Of Malaysia",  in Gerard Caprio Jr. and
Patrick Honohan, eds., Monetary  Policy  Instruments For Developint  Countries,  World Bank,  Washington  DC, 1991,  pp. 131-137.
14  Ronald McKinnon,  The Order Of Economic Liberalization op Cit.12
III  ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Allocation and Monitoring
Securities markets have a role to play in "picking  winners"  in the enterprise sector of
LDC economies but It would be unwise  to think of it as an easy or assured role. Where the problems
of the banking sector are large there is sometimes a temptation to look to the securities market for
quick or temporary solutions.'  In other  cases enthusiasm for the adoption of capitalist market
mechanisms sometimes leads to  unrealistically high expectations of what securities markets can
provide in the short term.  In fact, the reform and development effort required for securities markets
to  reach  the desired goal of  efficiently allocating savings and  monitoring  the  performance of
enterprises is likely to be at least as long-term and complex as that for banks.
Comparing the relative advantages  of banks and securities markets iliustrates  why  this
is so.  The main point at issue is that picking winners and monitoring their performance is a matter
of making judgements and decisions, so to do it effectively requires sufficient relevani information,
and the skill and experience of market participants to make good use of that information.
Banks which make loans to  enterprises  have the  opportunity  to  obtain detailed
information on  the  past, present  and  likely future  of the  enterprises, and  to  maintain a close
relationship with management during the term of a loan (or, more commonly during the long period
during which short-term loans are roiled over).  To a degree they have the opportunity to become
insiders in the enterprise's affairs. Also, because they are in the business of making many loans, they
have the capacity to build a body of expertise to guide their decision-making. As mentioned, in many
emerging market countries the banks do not make effective use of their special position in relation
to their customers and part of financial sector institutional development work is directed to having
them do so.  This is often a long-term process because it requires considerable staff training and
management systems  development in the banks, and the associated accounting  and legal reforms often
take a long time to be adopted and widely implemented.
u3  McKinnon  argues  for a radical  pmposal  along these  lines  in Eastern  Europe.  his Section  implicitly  rejects  his view  and
provides  some  counter  arguments  but  does not  directly  addres his  total  proposal.  Interested  readerm  should  refer  to McKinnon
(1991)  op ciL13
But what of securities market investors;  do they have an opportunity similar to banks
to  be  insiders in the  enterprises  in which they invest?  The  answer depends  on  the  size and
sophistication of  the  investor:  in  a  market  with  a  well developed  non-bank  financial sector
(stockbrokers, investment houses, contractual  savings institutions, bond  rating  agencies)  these
institutions can come closc to the level of knowledge of banks but even for them there is likely to
be  an  information  imbalance in  favor of  the  banks.  Less well developed  markets  and  less
sophisticated securities investors do not have the special access to information which lending banks
have, nor the ability to consult with management. They also usually  lack the financial analysis  and
enterprise assessment expertise potentially available within banks.  As a consequence, building the
capacity of securities markets to pick winners from among enterprises seeking to raise funds is likely
to be at least as large a task as working with banks to the same end.
In essence there are three avenues of action to build the capacity  of securities markets
in this area  - improving information disclosure by enterprises; advising and educating the general
investor; and enhancing the role of contractual savings institutions and other large investors.  Each
is discussed briefly below.
Information disclosure.  A company which raises funds from the  public must be
required  to  disclose sufficient information to  allow an  educated  investor to  make  a  reasoned
investment decision so that  the aggregate of investors' decisions may be  a good assessment of a
company's worth." 6 This requires an effective legal infrastructure to specify and enforce disclosure
standards for all companies issuing securities to the public. Those companies which have securities
listed for secondary trading on a market such as a stock exchange should be subject to additional
disclosure requirements imposed as listing rules.  And because much of what will be disclosed is
financial reports,  these laws and rules must be backed up by the adoption and use of generally
accepted accounting principles and auditing standards by an accounting profession which adheres to
a stringent code of ethics in the accounting profession and the market supervisory  authority.
Three difficu.lties  are worth highlighting  from this brief list of disclosure requirements.
First, public disclosure of information will never put a securities investor on the same footing as an
16  iS  Is a policy  makers  practical  appmach  to the topic; economists  are debating  a range  of issues  related  to  whether  investors
do in fact make  reasoned  decisions  based  on available  information.  See for ammple  Haltiwanger  and Waldman,  "Rational
Expectations  And The  LUmits  Of Rationality.  An Analysis  Of Heterogeneity9,  in American  Economic  Review,  Vol.7S,  198S,
pp327;  De Long, Shleifer, Summes and Waldman,  "  Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing  Rational
Speculation",  in Journal of Finance,  Vol.4S,  1990,  pp379, and Stiglitz,  Joseph,  "Information  and Capital  Markets",  in W F Sbarpe
and C Cootner, eds.. Financial Economicsr Essavs In Honor Of Paul Cootner Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1982.14
insider or  a  lending bank. This  is because  it is costly and  may be con mercially damaging for
enterprises to disclose information publicly so there is an upper limit on what it is reasonable to
require, while disclosure  of information to insiders does not face the same limitation. Second, to the
degree that the information required to be a&closed publiclv approaches that available to insiders,
there is a concornitant disincentive for the enterprise to raise funds in the securities market - for the
cost and commercial damage reasons mentioned above, and, notably in many emerging markets, for
reasons deriving from a desire for privacy concerning financial affairs.  And third, the extent of
regulatory  and  institutional  development  required  in  adopting  and  enforcing  adequate  public
disclosure standards implies a long-term and complex reform and development program.
Advice and education.  Having got sufficient information out  to  investors, there
remains the problem of equipping them to make good use of it. Because the financial literacy of the
public in most emerging markets is not high, this is a major issue.  The market-based answer is to
allow the growth of business analysis and investment advice industries, and the financial press.  In
many emerging markets the practice is to fill the gap left by the long lead-time needed before any
of these develop by  instituting government-organized public education programs, sometimes in co-
operation with stock exchanges. This is probably a necessary  practice given the lack of other avenues
for investment education. But it is a cost on government, is usually  not something government is well
equipped to do, and runs the danger of being co-mingled  with securities market promotion goals the
government may have, or being  confused as investment advice  with an implicit  government guarantee.
Contractual savings  institutions. The advice and education problem can be mitigated
by pooling  investors' funds  for professional  investment management by contractual savings  institutions.
In essence, this is a means of reducing the transaction and information costs of investors who place
their  funds with  the  institutions.  It  also has  the  advantage of creating market  leaders whose
investment decisions can act as signals  for other investors, thus reducing the information costs of the
'free  riders'.  It can therefore  be a  useful strategy but  is of course usually a major reform and
development program in its own right." 7
It  may also bring some problems to  securities markets.  For example, where the
market is thin, concentration of ownership and trading of securities into relatively few hands leads
to problems of lack of liquidity  in the market and increased capacity for market manipulation with
17  See Dimitri Vittas and R Skully  "Overiew of Contractual Savings  Institutions",  PRE Working  Paper Series, No.605, 1991,  for
a dision  of the social  welfare and financial system benefits of contractual savings  institutions other than in relation to the
securities market; and Vittas,  n  Contractual Savings  and Emerging Securities Markets", WPS858,  World Bank, Februay  1992
for a brief summary of links between the two.15
consequent price distortion effects.  These problems may be lessened through having a carefully
balanced approach to both widespread and pooled investment  so that the market remains sufficiently
liquid, and by strengthening the capacity of the securities supervisory authority to detect and deter
market manipulation.  Another common problem is that large institutions often prefer to trade in
over the counter and "upstairs"  markets for big deals, thus reducing liquidity in the public market.
Forcing them to trade on the public market may have economic benefits but it may also reduce the
return to the investors in the contractual institutions who would have been better served by having
the institutions left to deal in their own best interest.
Corporate Governance
Good corporate governance is the stewardship of an enterprise's assets for the benefit
of its owners.  In a private company the owner and manager can be thought of as the same person
and can be assumed to act in the best interest of the company. In contrast, the shareholders who
own a public company must ensure that the managers who are their agents in the day to day running
of the enterprise are exercising good corporate governance.  Without checks on (mis)management
of a public company, there is no assurance of good corporate governance. This is often referred to
as an  agency problem - a problem of how managers of public companies are  to be  monitored,
controlled and disciplined to serve the interests of the owners at large.' 8
It is argued .hat securities markets impose a discipline  on managers, and protect and
reward shareholders, by exposing companies to the threat of takeover if the assets of the company
are not being well managed. The effectiveness of this mechanism is much debated in the context of
developed markets and is largely untested in relation to emerging markets." 9 It would not be wise
to uncritically  accept the notion that the discipline  of the market will on its own bring good corporate
governance.
There is an aaensive literature on this topic. For an overview  see Kathleen M Eisenhardt, "Agency  Theoty. An Assessment  and
Review', in Academy of ManaRement  Review Vol. 14, No. 1, Januaty 1989. Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and
Private Property. 1932,  provides  a seminal  consideration of the issues but for a critical review  see George J Stigler  and Claire
Friedland, "The Literature Of Economics: The Case Of Berle And Means",in  Journal of Law  And Economics,  Vol.26,  June
1983, pp. 237-271.
A rather partisan overview  is provided ty Michael Jensen and Richard S Ruback, "lTbe  Market For Corporate Control: The
Scientific  Evidence",  in Journal of Financial Economics,  Vol. 11, April 1983,  pp.  5-SO. Dailami  and Atkin, briefly  discuss  related
issues and conclude that it is an important question requiring further investigation  in LDCs; see "Stock  Markets In Developing
Countrics: Key Issues  and a Research Agenda",  World Bank WPS 515, pp.28-29.16
On the other hand, if it is to be relied upon at all, it is necessary to ensure that the
market is able to act as efficiently as possible in the role. In essence this amounts to building on the
information  disclosure  base to provide clear legal channels and relatively  efficient and fair procedures
for corporate takeovers and shareholder proxy  solicitation. The information base is the starting point
because it alerts owners and potential new investors that action is required. The resultant action can
be of two kinds:  merger or acquisition by another corporation, or exercise of shareholder voting
rights to change the composition of the board.  Both of these raise complex issues which involve
trade-offs between efficiency  and equity. For example,  some countries require a person who controls
a sulstantial proportion of a company (say 15 or 20%) to make a general takeover offer to all other
shareholders at a price determined according to law;  while other countries make no such stipulation.
One approach is based on the view that minority shareholders should be protected from having the
balance of majority ownership change without giving them an escape route.  The other approach
assumes that the flow of information and the opportunity for trading in the market are sufficient to
maximize  shareholder welfare without interference of specific rules. It is also interesting to note that
only a few countries experience significant  numbers of takeovers - the USA and UK are two -and the
takeover rules are substantially different between them.  Japan has takeover rules modelled on the
USA but has very few actual examples of takeovers, and neither do many  other developed economies.
It follows  that direct market based disciplines  should be supplemented by more general
legal protections and rights of action so that investors rights can be assumed with confidence to be
sufficiently  protected and managers sufficiently  disciplined. This requires not only that suitable laws
be in place, but that the avenues of action provided for in the law be in fact available to shareholders.
For example, the management of a company must be enjoined by law to serve the interests of the
owners; shareholders must be empowered to  call general meetings of shareholders and require
management to report to such meetings;  voting rights which attach to shares must be clear in law and
exercisable in practice; and shareholders must have a right of action against management in the courts
20  There is a large economics literature on this topic with,  as yet little dear agreement that either takeover  or shareholder control
of board positions in fact provide the net shareholder benefit that it is assumed they sbould. See Michael Jensen and Richard
Ruback, "The Market For Corporate Contro", 22 _c  Michael  Jensen and William  Meckling,  "Theory  of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,  Agency  Costs and Ownership  Structure",  Journal of Financial Economics,  Vol. 3, October 1976,  pp. 305-360; Hemy
Manne, 'Mergers and the Market For Corporate Control",  in Journal of Political Economy,  Vol. 73, April 1965, pp. 110-120;
Gregg A Jarrell, "The Wealth Effects of Litigation By Targets:  Do interests Diverge In A Merger,  in Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol.28, April 1985, pp.151-17 7;  ard  John Pound, "Shareholder Activism  And Share Values:  The Causcs And
Consequences Of Countersolicitations  Against Mai agement Antitakover  Proposals, in Journal of Law and Economies,  Vol32,
October 1989, pp. 357-379.17
or other commercial tribunals to require disclosure of information or other action (or restraint on
action) by management where management is not serving the interests of the company. These rights
and protections are usually  provided for in the law which allows for the establishment of a company
and the public offer of its shares - this may be a different law from the one which deals with the
securities market.  And more general legal rights relating to contract and agency relations contained
in commercial and civil codes are also involved.
This is obviously a complex process and one which shareholders are in general ill-
equipped to  pursue.  It  is very hard to ensure  that  these rights are in fact exercisable through
relatively speedy, transparent, and consistent judicial systems,  and even then the costs are often very
high.  It is a long term institution building task.
In the interim, and as a supplement in the long term, the rights of shareholders must
be protected as much as possible by the securities market regulatory agency. The agency can act on
their  behalf in  monitoring  and  investigating the  activities of  companies and  can  prosecute or
otherwise change the behavior of managers  who are not serving the interests of shareholders. As the
market grows, private sector institutions will also have a role - for example the financial and credit
rating agencies.18
IV  MARKET STRUCIURE
Securities markets are under pressure from within and without to change the way they
are structured and operated.  These changes will have increasing importance in LDCs and policy
makers should orient their planning to take account of the regulatory and institutional adjustments
necessary. Three examples are discussed briefly below to indicate the nature of the issues involved.
Blurring Of Product And Serv;e  Boundaries
It  is no longer feasible to  think of distinct classes of  intermediaries engaged in
providing distinct financial services. In the USA there has b storically  been a strict prohibition on
banks participating in the securities industry but this is under attack and is being increasingly  relaxed.
Elsewhere, universal banks, or banks operating through separate, specialized subsidiaries,  are active
in the full range of securities activities: securities broking and investment advisory  services,  securities
underwriting and syndication; securitized product origination; and mergers and acquisitions advice.
For their  part, stock brokers have established a  full range of services:  discretionary investment
accounts in which they hold client funds on deposit and manage the investment of the funds at the
brokers' discretion; securities trading on credit based on margin lending to clients; and mutual funds
and other managed investment  vehicles  which issue  securities to the public. And insurance companies
routinely  offer  investment products  such  as  performance-linked annuities  which  more closely
resemble securities market mutual funds than traditional insurance products.
These changes have implications  for regulatory boundaries and overlap. For example,
from the point of view of a bank engaged in diverse financial activities it is costly, time-consuming
and sometimes impossible to comply with the regulations and prccedures imposed by each of the
supervisory authoritie.  in the different areas of its activity. Conversely,  from the point of view of a
securities market regulator, it is dangerous to allow securities investment products to be marketed
by intermediaries such as bank or insurance companies which are not subject to the same entry and
conduct of business rules as securities intermediaries.
Unravelling the overlap is not easy and is not  a once-and -for-all process.  The
starting point is to regulate by function, not institution.  This establishes uniform regulation across
all participants in any one activity  and is therefore more equitable and less confusing. The next step
is to clarify lines of supervisory authority and to co-ordinate between supervisors  so that regulations19
and laws do not duplicate, conflict or leave gaps in coverage either  in law or in practice.  This is
essential to overcome the problems that arise when a single institution like a bank must answer to
several regulators.  In reality this coordination is difficult to achieve and requires constant attention
and adjustment by supervisory authorities.
Supervisors  must also be alert to new regulatory issues generated by structural change.
For example, conflict of interest problems arise when financial institutions offer general investment
advice and  portfolio management services at the same time as marketing their own investment
products; and competitive imbalances may arise when banks are allowed to  enter  the securities
underwriting business and use their access to cheaper capital to dominate the market at the expense
of a more diverse stock broking industry. Resolving  these issues is a mix  of regulatory, economic,  and
political decision-making  which throws up a variety of fluid solutions.
One key to dealing with these and other innovations in a field as dynamic  as securities
markets is to ensure that laws and regulations allow for change rather than impede it.  In other
words, that the law be basically  permissive  rather thaii restrictive, and that it confer on the supervisory
authority sufficient power and discretion to interpret the law and promulgate new regulations in a
way which facilitates beneficial developments.  This allows regulatory practice to keep pace with
developments. It also carries the danger of providing the supervisor with discretionary power which
may be abused.  To protect against the latter it is essential to back-up this approach with institution
building to create a skilled and dedicated supervisory authority capable of striking an appropriate
balance between market facilitation and investor protection.
Regional And International Integration
Cross-bordex  securities market activity is increasing in three ways:
i)  capital  raisers  seek  access  to  foreign  portfolio  investment funds,  and
conversely investors seek access to foreign investment opportunities (r.ow a
very common feature of many LDC markets);
ii)  in LDCs which are too small to sustain a viable securities market on their
own, creation of  regional  .iiarkets can serve  the  needs  of  several small
neighboring countries (currently under  discussion in West Africa and the
Caribbean); and20
iii)  efficiency gains in  the  performance of  some  high-cost securities market
functions such electronic clearance and settlement  of transactions may be
obtained  through  economies of scale arising from cross-border sharing of
expensive equipment (currently under dis-ussion in Latin America).
Two kinds of supervisory  issues are raised by these developments. The first relate to
capital mobility impacts on monetary and foreign exchange policies.  These have been discussed
earlier  in the  paper.  The second relate to securities market supervisory complexities which fail
basically intr  two categories:  agreements as to  jurisdiction; and arrangements for international
regulatory co-operation.
Key areas to be  addressed in dealing with these issues include some of the most
difficult regulatory issues in the financial sector today. EEC negotiations on the issues illustrate the
difficulties and provide a model of what to do or what not to do, depending on your point of view.
Three basic issues which must te  resolved are the following:
(i)  Agreement orn the principles of national treatment, home country regulation and a
degree  of  harmonization or  complementarity of regulation.  Such agreement  is
proving difficult in the EEC although some progress is being made and may provide
a  model for LDCs.  LDCs will find it especially challenging to  reach agreement
because it implies an established regulatory infrastructure in each country on which
to build the co-operation.
(ii)  Accords for cross-jurisdictional  communication and co-operation in the approval of
prospectuses, licensing of intermediaries, specification of instruments, and  for the
exchange of criminal intelligence. These are thorny legal and practical issues which
are the backbone of successful creation of a regional market.
(iii)  Accords for cross-jurisdictional  monitoring, investigation  and prosecution of breaches
of the law which might be  committed by a person in one country ( eg: someone
selling shares they do not own) against the law in another  country (eg: the stock
exchange and general commercial law of the country in which the transaction takes
place)  to the detriment of a person in another country (eg: the purchaser of the
securities). Successful  action against this kind of activity  is very hard at even the most21
basic level of identifying  what law has been broken by whom and which jurisdiction
should carry the cost of investigation and prosecution.  More complex steps such as
freezing assets or repatriating the proceeds of crime across jurisdictions can be very
difficult and yet form the basis of successful enforcement.
Infornmation  Technology
Advances in information technology have brought new ways  of structuring, operating
and supervising  securities markets. In the past decade in particular, the use of information technology
in securities markets has had a profound impact, not only in the large well-established  markets, but
also in many  LDCs.  For example securities trading, clearance and settlement is highly  computerized
in Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico,  Chile, Turkey and soon will be in Venezuela.
Securities market supervisors  must keep abreast of the regulatory implications  of these
changes and have in place suitable laws and regulations and supervisory  systems to deal effectively
with  the  new environment.  In  particular, supervisors should ensure  that  the  market  remains
transparent  and equitable and  that system parameters are  adequate for peak loads and disaster
recovery so that system stability is protected.
This topic is dealt with in detail in Pardy's paper "Securities Market Trading and
Settlement Systems: "Regulatory  And Institutional Impacts Of Securities Market Computerization",
Working Paper No. 866, February 1992.22
V  THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND SUPERVISORY CAPACITY
Securities markets are notabiy free market institutions but much of what they do is
significantly  affected by the direct and indirect actions of government. 2'  This has the advantage of
equipping g.vernment with tools to achieve its policy goals for the supervision and development of
securities markets.  On the other hand it has the disadvantage that government actions can easily
diminish  or negate the positive contribution securities markets can make to the economy by distorting
the decisions  of capital raisers and investors. It is therefore especially  important in securities markets
to find the right balance between market forces and government intervention and to ensure  that
government involvement is well targeted and efficiently executed.
Supervision and Development
Government intervention in securities markets is often a mix  of two kinds and this can
bring about conflict or a lack of clarity  in the goals being pursued. The two kinds of intervention are
supervisory  and developmental. Governmcnt may  supervise the market through laws,  regulations and
a supervisory authority with the goal of ensuring  that it operates  in a fair, efficient and stable
manner.  It may also implement policies designed to develop the securities market through both
incentives and compulsion with the goal of ensuring that capital raisers and investors have access to
a range of securities instruments, and trading and trade-related facilities adequate for their needs.
An example of  conflict between  these  two is the  developmental goal of  having
widespread ownership of company stock and  the potentially conflicting goal of encouraging the
accumulation of savings in contractual institutions which are permitted to hold and  freely trade
substantial securities portfolios, thus narrowing share ownership.  Another example is the tension
between the goal of developing the market through encouraging companies to offer their securities
to  the public and the  disincentive to go public created by the regulatory goal of fairness wnich
requires extensive information disclosure by such companies.
21  This is of course true not just of securities markets but of markets in general.  See Douglas North, Institutions. Institutional
Change and Econonmic  Performance op cit.; and Robert Wade, Governing The Market: Economic lheory And The Role Of
Government In East Asian Industrialzation  Princeton University  Press, New Jersey, 1990.23
This last example highlights  the potential for a securities market supervisory  authority
to lose track of its mission  and goals. The supervisory  function requires personnel with a strong sense
of commitment and common purpose, as well as specific technical skills. It is somewhat simplistic  but
not far from the truth to say that a suspicious  mind and a determination to see fair play and financial
stability in the market are the hallmarks of a good supervisor. The corporate culture of a successful
supervisory agency will clearly reflect this tendency.  As a result it may not sit well with the role of
market development which requires a different corporate culture - one which emphasizes market-
oriented creativity, and an open, facilitative mind-set.
Some countries deal with the problem by  splitting the two roles between two agencies.
This can lead to a lack of coordination and bureaucratic jealousies as well as increased rigidity  in bo:h
agencies.  Others  combine them in one  agency, which requires close attention  to  defining and
redefining the  agency's mission, goals and corporate culture, but avoids the rigidity of the other
approach.
Development
Whatever administrative  arrangement is adopted, govemment efforts to develop the
securities market are by no means assured to deliver a beneficial  result: it has the potential to distort
or derail  the securities market's course of development just  as much as it has the potential to
facilitate it.  Success or failure is a function of the type and intensity of the intervention.
Where  the  government has  the  intention of  generating rapid securities  market
development there is a tendency to intervene more extensively  and forcefully  in order to force a kind
of "hot house" growth.  This intense intervention increases the likelihood of distorting the path of
securities m;irket development because it accelerates growth and change ahead of the real demands
of capital raisers and  investors.  And apart  from the question of intensity, success or failure of
government intervention depends on it being an appropriate role for government in the circumstances
and on it being well targeted and executed. Inappropriate or badly  executed intervention can impose
unnecessary  costs on the private sector or add a distorting factor to decision making by capital raisers
and investors.
An example which illustrates the point is the question of what should be the extent
and nature of government efforts to stimulate the growth of securities markets where they are absent
or small. Three possible responses of government taken from real-world examples are:24
(a)  intervene directly and closely in the securities market; for example:
(i)  reduce  capital  raising costs  by  offering  a  significant tax  advantage  to
companies which go public and list their equity securities; or
(ii)  increase the stock of tradable securities to provide market depth by directing
that  all companies with a capital value of more than  $1m  and a five year
business history must list their securities; or
(iii)  reduce transaction costs by fixing  brokerage commission fees at a low level;
or
(iv)  by lowering the direct cost of market infrastructure costs by financing and
operating a modern stock exchange or securities clearing  organization directly
by government or through government subsidy;
(b)  alter policy  in areas which have an impact on the securities market in ways  which will
directly stimulate the market; for example:
(i)  put a cap on the amount of credit allowed to be provided to enterprises by
commercial banks and lower the effective interest rate on bank deposits thus
pushing both capital raisers and investors to the securities market; or
(ii)  stimulate liquidity in the securities market by appiying a low or zero capital
gains tax to trading profits while taxing other unearned income;
(c)  alter the more general policy  environment with the intention of facilitating  the growth
of the securities market; for example:
(i)  maintain a  sound and stable macro-economy, keep  interest  rates low but
positive  and remove differential tax  treatments of investment alternatives;  and
(ii)  free up foreign investment rules and procedures to facilitate foreign portfolio
investment.25
It is clear that government has a range of tools available  to stimulate securities market
growth. But the question is when should it use those tools and which ones. If a significant  number
of profitable enterprises are near the limit of their borrowNing  capacity and their expansion is being
constrained by the high cost of raising capital in the securities markets, options such as those in (a)
could be considered to facilitate market growth and meet the needs of the companies. On the other
hand, if the stock of household savings is too low to provide effective demand for new securities or
if business profitability is generally low, interventions such as in (a) would be ineffective or distort
investment decisions. The better developmental option is (c) which attempts to create a favorable
investment climate for securities.
But let us assume for the moment that it is appropriate to consider option (a) because
profitable enterprises are constrained by market deficiencies from raising needed capital.  What are
some of the choices and questions that arise in this situation?
On the supply side, option (a) suggests  two ways  to increase the number of companies
listed on  the  stock  exchange:  (i)  provide a  taxation incentive or  (ii) institute  a  size-related
compulsion. Similarly  on the demand side two options are suggested: (iii) keep transactioL  costs low
by holding down brokerage  fees or  (iv) subsidize the  cost of market  infrastructure to  increase
transaction efficiency.
The first supply side suggestion has some merit because it seeks to  make it more
attractive for companies to consider diversified financing but leaves the decision to the companies.
The negatives of the suggestion are that it will mean a revenue loss for government and may mean
an excessively  tax-driven decision by companies unless finely calculated to provide just that amount
of incentive that is required to overcome the reluctance to list.
The second of the supply side suggestions has very little to recommend it because
compulsion to list bears no relation to the needs of the companies to raise capital in the securities
markets.  It  is a policy focused on expanding the securities market rather than on allowing the
securities market to expand to meet the needs of capital raisers and investors.
On the demand side, the first suggestion is not likely to be beneficial. It proposes to
constrain transaction costs by holding down fees.  It thereby sets the scene for costs to be shifted
elsewhere by brokers - possibly to  increased underwriting fees which will raise the cost of listing26
companies; or  for  the  proliferation  of  under-funded  and  consequently  inefficient  brokerage
operations.
The sec-nd demand side suggestion is more positive in that it facilitates  but does not
force market development. It focuses on the provision  of infrastructure, which is an appropriate role
for government where costs are high and there are free rider problems and other externalities. But
it could be an expensive undertaking initially and careful attention would have to be paid to cost
recovery in the medium term or it would be a drain on government revenue.  It also requires a
degree of technical sophistication in design and operation which may be hard to find in government
without extensive training and institution building and related changes to salary structures to retain
newly trained personnel.
From  these  examples it  can  be  seen  that  in  practice  targeting  and  managing
intervention by govemment in the development of the securities market requires careful consideration
of possible outcomes, intended or unintended.
Supervision
There are four basic forms of regulatory activity in securities markets - prudential,
protective,  organizational  and  structural.'  Prudential  controls  establish  capital  adequacy
requirements for intermediaries and a system for monitoring and enforcing the requirements. They
impose direct capital costs justified on the basis of the need to overcome market externalities such
as possible systemic contagion from the financial failure of an intermediary.
Protective controls set a framework for the relations between intermediaries and their
clients and between small and large investors.  They emphasize information disclosure, clarity of
contractual relationship, and strict fiduciary responsibility. To the extent that they seek to protect
the smallest or least sophisticated investor, the cost they impose is increased.  Striking a balance
between over and under protection is a matter of fine judgement.
Organizational  controls  provide  for  the  establishment  and  operation  of  such
organizations as stock exchanges,  clearing houses and market information systems. They aim to allow
for contestability of the market for providing these services but they do impose entry criteria such as
22  These categories are from Dimitri Vittas,  MThe  Impact Of Regulation On Minancial  Intermediation",  World  Bank, WPS 746,
August 1991.27
financial soundness and technical competence of the service provider so that the stability of the
system as a whole may be protected.
And finally, structural controls allow government to manage the overall balance and
shape of the securities market through such mechanisms as restrictions on foreign ownership of
intermediaries, on the type of activity  in which an intermediary may engage, and on the specifications
of the instruments which may be traded.
These four forms of regulatory activity translate in practice to the performance of a
diverse range of functions: rule making,  market monitoring and investigation,  prosecution of breaches
of the law, examination and approval of prospectuses and other corporate documents, auditing of
financial statements and otber documents of intermediaries, and supervision of the operational and
financial stability of stock exchanges, clearing houses and other types of market service provider.
The practical implementation of the law and general policies through the performance
of these functions is likely to have as much impact on the efficiency, fairness and stability of the
market as the adoption of the law and policies themselves  because a great deal of discretionary  power
is often involved."  And as has been indicated in earlier sections of this paper, these functions must
be carried out in situations of policy conflict and fluidity.
One important result of this is that securities market supervision is labor intensive and
relies for success on the commitment, judgement and skill of the personnel involved.  Extensive
training,  re-training,  andu staff  supervision  are  required  to  achieve  the  necessary level  of
professionalism.  So too is an organizational structure and corporate  culture which ensures high
ethical and technical standards.  This is clearly a long term institution building exercise for many
LDCs.
23  This point has been made in other  areas. A recemnt  World Bank study confirms its importance  Deborah Brautigam,
"Govenance and Economy  A Review', WPS 815, December 1991. And evidence from preliminary  work by Andrew Stone,
Brian Lcvy and Ricardo Paredes on  the relative cost to  business of  formal law and regulations compared to actual
implementation  indicates that implementation may be the more important.  (A preliminary  condusion from work in progrss
comparing the legal and regulatory  environment for business transactions In several southern cone countries.)28
VI  CONCLUDINC;  REMARK
Securities  markets have an important role to play in financial  liberalization  and
deepening.  Principally,  they  provide  a means  of diversifying  risk  for both capital  raisers  and investors.
But they  also play  other roles;  for example  they  are a mechanism  for capital  allocation  and corporate
monitoring,  and a means for government  to exercise  market-based  rather than direct fiscal and
monetary  policies.
Government  plays  a central  part in facilitating  the growth  of sound  securities  markets.
Fistly they  must lay  the legal  and institutional  foundations  for the market to grow. Then they  must
supervise  the market to ensure that it operates in an efficient,  fair and stable manner. And, in the
background,  they must  create the right  macroeconomic  conditions  for market growth.
T'his  suggests  that a very substantial  institution  building  task confronts  many  LDCs
wishing  to  develop a sound securities market.  The present paper provides guidance  on basic
infrastructural  requirements  and also provides  practical  examples  of policy  conflict  or coordination
problems  which  must be confronted,  of market  failures  which  must be mitigated,  and of the range  of
supervisory  functions  required to be carried out if the securities  market is to operate successfully.
These add up to  a significant  administrative  load on government and a significant  degree of
government  intervention  in the operation  of the securities  markets.  Building  the institutional  capacity
to carry  out this role is one of the keys  to successful  securities  market development.
World Bank support for this type of long term institutional  development  is of
relatively  recent origin. Buyck 24 provides  a useful  survey  and recommendations  on ways  to improve
Bank  effectiveness  in institutional  development  which  are relevant  to the topic  of this  paper. Among
other points, she emphasizes  the  need for clear government commitment  to  an institutional
development program based on close institutional  analysis,  and the integration of short term
consultants  and long term technical assistance  to  build local human resource capacities. Her
recommendations  are manifestly  relevant to  the type of institutional  development  of securities
markets  outlined  here.
24  BalteO  Buyck,  Me  hank's  Use  Of  Technical  Assistance  For  Ititutional  Development,  WPS  578,  World  Bank.  Januay  11.29
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